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1. Introduction 
This paper is a theoretical and empirical study of international influences on the 
Australian dollar during the period 1985 to 2001. Its theoretical basis is atemporally 
non-separable preferences. These imply international variables in the money demand 
function and third-currency effects in exchange-rate determination. We build on the 
currency  substitution  literature  and  introduce  the  possibility  of  currency 
complementarity. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates our research to previous 
work, including an update of a landmark comparison of income velocities of circulation 
(Brittain 1981). Section 3 provides an informal analysis of currency substitution and 
currency complementarity, followed by a formal model based on the cash-in-advance 
paradigm. Section 4 investigates some associated empirics. It re-examines the demand 
for the Australian dollar, and also investigates third-currency effects on the external 
value of the dollar. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. A theoretical appendix draws 
out implications of our model for pricing currencies and discount bills, and an empirical 
appendix confirms the stability of money demand estimates in the main text. 
 
2. Antecedents 
Theory  typically  postulates  that  the  demand  for  a  nation’s  money  is  wholly 
determined by two domestic macroeconomic variables. Thus the textbook condition for 
equilibrium in the market for the Australian dollar is 
( ) R Y L
P
M
, =   (1) 
where M is the outstanding stock of Australian money, P is the general level of prices of 
Australian-produced goods and services, Y is the general level of real economic activity   2                                                                                                                                              
and R is some measure of short-term interest rates in Australia. If prices are assumed 
sticky,  we  describe  Eq.  (1)  as  the  “LM  curve”.  If  not,  the  term  “portfolio  balance 
schedule” is often used instead. We assume  0 > ¶ ¶ Y L  and  0 < ¶ ¶ R L ; Y is the “scale 
variable”, and R is the “opportunity cost” variable in the money demand function.  
            Tobin (1969)  added  bond and  stock returns  to the menu of opportunity-cost 
variables, with bills, bonds and stocks all assumed to be “gross substitutes” for money. 
This has no  deep  theoretical rationale. On the other hand, the unaugmented money 
demand  function  on  the  right-hand  side  of  Eq.  (1)  is  readily  given  a  theoretical 
justification;  candidate  microfoundations  for  money  demand  have  included  money 
directly in the utility function (Lucas 2000), and money indirectly in the utility function 
via a cash-in-advance constraint (Lucas 1984, Lucas and Stokey 1987). Whether the 
resulting money demand is direct or derived matters little in applications. These include 
estimating money demand functions (Mark and Sul 2002) and explaining the behavior 
of exchange rates (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996). 
The standard model of the money market [i.e., Eq. (1)] is restrictive compared to 
treatments of some other markets. A case in point is alcoholic beverages (Clements and 
Selvenathan 1991, Clements et al 1996). Holding constant the total consumption of 
alcohol in Australia, there is evidence of substitution across beer and wine in the sense 
that the two relevant cross-price elasticities are negative, consistent with the fact that a 
fall  in  beer  consumption  per  head  has  gone  hand  in  hand  with  a  rise  in  wine 
consumption per head. On the other hand, there is evidence of complementarity between 
beer and spirits in the sense that if we hold constant the marginal utility of income then 
a rise in the relative price of spirits has been associated with a fall in the consumption of 
beer, a finding that has been rationalized by the “formal dinner model” of an evening 
meal that kicks off with beer and finishes with spirits. Wine is neither a substitute nor a   3                                                                                                                                              
complement for the other two beverages, in the sense that if we again hold constant the 
marginal utility of income then a change in the relative price of wine does not induce a 
significant change in the consumption of either beer or spirits.  
A  challenge  for  monetary  economics  is  to  match  this  level  of  analytical 
sophistication. 
 
2.1. Currency substitution  
Theoretical and empirical research on money demand has given consideration to 
the possibility of currency substitution (related to the concept of “dollarization”). The 
pioneering contribution was Boyer (1970), and an influential survey is Giovannini and 
Turtelbloom (1994).  
For developed-world currencies the evidence from money demand regressions 
has been mixed. Among the pound, the mark and the US dollar, for example, only 
German  M0  and  M1  can  be  regarded  as  having  shown  anything  like  persuasive 
evidence of substituting for some other currency (Brittain 1981, Cuddington 1982, Traa 
1985). In the case of Canada, for example, scant evidence has been found, despite the 
plausibility of the hypothesis that US dollars are a substitute for Canadian ones (Bordo 
and Choudri 1982, Traa 1985).  
Since the 1990s, research on currency substitution has continued apace, but has 
largely been confined either to pure theory or to the empirics of transition economies; 
see,  e.g.  Trejos and  Wright  (2000)  and  Liviatan  (1993)  respectively. Moreover,  the 
possibility of currency complementarity seems never to have been considered in any 
setting. The present paper formulates and tests a model that allows for non-separable 
currency  preferences  in  the  case  of  developed-world  currencies,  including  the 
possibility of complementarity, and with special reference to the Australian dollar.   4                                                                                                                                              
 
2.2. Velocity comparisons 
Brittain’s (1981) evidence of substitution between the deutschmark and the US 
dollar included a graphical comparison of income velocities of money in Germany and 
the United States. Rising velocity of US M1 contrasted with falling velocity of German 
M1, suggesting that there had been a substitution of deutschmarks for US dollars. While 
never represented as more than a prelude to formal regression tests, Brittain’s graphical 
exercise shed light, and proved to be influential.  
This subsection updates Brittain’s V1 comparisons to the period spanned by our 
regressions, namely 1985 to 2001, and broadens the scope of the exercise by bringing in 
Japan and Australia. Additionally, we calculate pairwise correlation coefficients, across 
the four countries just mentioned. The coefficients include logged and differenced V0, 
as well as logged and differenced V1. For details see Figs. 1 and 2. 
Fig. 1 compares the logs of V1 in Germany, Japan and the United States over the 
period 1985 to the turn of the century (v denotes logs ). 
[Fig. 1 here] 
Beginning  with  Germany,  Brittain’s  finding  that  German  and  US  V1  are 
negatively correlated is confirmed by Fig. 1. However, the extent of negative correlation 
between logged and differenced V1 in the two countries is only –0.05. The relevant 
correlation coefficient for logged and differenced V0, namely –0.01, is even smaller in 
absolute value, although it too has a negative sign. 
For  the  Germany-Japan  pairing  we  get  a  mixed  message;  the  correlation  is 
negative for V1 but positive for V0. Accordingly, Fig. 1 sheds little light on whether 
there has been either substitution or complementarity between the mark and the yen. By   5                                                                                                                                              
contrast, there are two positive coefficients for the Japan-US pairing, consistent with 
complementarity between the yen and the US dollar. 
In this study, formal multivariate tests for substitution and complementarity are 
confined to pairs involving the Australian dollar. At this point we give an informal 
indication; see Fig. 2. 
[Fig. 2 here] 
Fig. 2 suggests that the deutschmark substituted for the Australian dollar; the 
relevant correlation coefficients are –0.03 and –0.08. By contrast, Fig. 2 suggests also 
that the yen complemented the Australian dollar; the relevant coefficients are 0.04 and 
0.23. Both pairs of results are broadly consistent with Section 4’s regression results 
(which warrant more weight than Figs. 1 and 2). On the other hand, the US dollar is 
suggested  as  having  been  a  complement  with  the  Australian  dollar,  whereas  the 
regressions in Section 4 lead to the conclusion that the US dollar has neither substituted 
nor complemented its Australian counterpart. 
 
3. Theory 









= Y R                                                                              (2) 
where  ( ) n Y Y ,..., 1 º Y  is a vector of n constant-price GDPs, and  ( ) n R R ,..., 1 º R  is a 
vector of n short-term nominal interest rates. In other words, there are n scale variables 
and n opportunity-cost variables. 
As in standard theory we predict  1 1 0 L Y ¶ ¶ >  and  1 1 0 L R ¶ ¶ < . We have 
1 2 0 L R > ¶ ¶ <   (3)   6                                                                                                                                              
according to whether currency 2 is a substitute for or complement with currency 1. The 
intuition for the case of substitutes is as follows. Imagine that the representative agent is 
a "citizen of the world" – a cosmopolitan individual without any particular national 
habitat. Suppose further that currency 2 is a substitute for currency 1 in the Edgeworth 
sense,  that  is,  the  two  currencies  satisfy  similar  wants  or  needs.  If  2 R   rises  then 
standard theory tells us that  2 2 0 L R ¶ ¶ < , so there will be a fall in the  equilibrium real 
stock of currency 2. Having relinquished some of the liquidity services provided by 
currency 2, the representative agent will substitute towards one or more other currencies 
generating similar services. 
          Given Covered Interest Parity we can use the forward discount on currency 1, 
2 1 R R D - º , as the “international” opportunity–cost variable in Eq. (2), instead of  2 R . 
If  D  falls  while  1 R  remains  constant then there must  be an equal rise in  2 R . The 
demand for currency 1 is again predicted to rise. To the extent that Uncovered Interest 
Parity holds, the fall in D represents an expectation of appreciation of currency 1 against 
currency 2, so this prediction may have some intuitive appeal. What is essential is that 
we include more than one opportunity-cost variable in Eq. (2), thereby controlling for 
the money/discount bill margin and the domestic money/foreign money margin. 
Intuition for the case of complements follows readily. Suppose that currency 2 
complements currency 1 in the Edgeworth sense, in other words, the two monies are 
used in conjunction with each other. Once a rise in  2 R  has shrunk the real stock of 
currency 2, the representative agent no longer has the same need for currency 1, and the 
demand for it will fall. 
The interplay between foreign scale variables and domestic real balances is less 
straightforward.  On  the  one  hand,  one  might  expect  2 Y   to  affect  the  demand  for 
currency 1 in a way similar to the influence of  1 Y . A counter-argument is that a rise in   7                                                                                                                                              
2 Y , having induced a rise in  2 2 P M , might lead to less need for currency 1. This 
counter-argument has less force in the case of complements. Overall, we settle for  
1 2 0 L Y > ¶ ¶ - <   (4) 
with  a  presumption  that  the  sign  is  more  likely  to  be  positive  in  the  case  of 
complements. 
One would expect the effects of multiple changes in scale or opportunity-cost 
variables to be constrained by suitable multivariate analogues of the standard conditions 
0 > ¶ ¶ Y L  and  0 < ¶ ¶ R L . For example, a one percent rise in all national GDPs would 
be  expected  to  raise  the  demand  for  currency  1,  notwithstanding  the  ambiguity 
suggested by Eq. (4). Likewise, a one percentage point rise in all national interest rates 
would be expected to reduce the demand for currency 1, even in the case of substitution 
between currencies 1 and 2. 
 
3.1. Model 
The remainder of this section provides microfoundations for the money demand 
function (2), and the criteria (3) and (4). We use a multicountry generalization of the 
cash-in-advance model due to Lucas (1984) and Lucas and Stokey (1987). There are n 
"cash goods" that can be paid for only by means of currency i, and also n "credit goods" 
that  are  paid  for  by  means  of  one-period  trade  credits  denominated  in  currency  i 
( ) n i ,..., 1 = . One could think of the agent' s wallet as containing n distinct currencies, and 
also n credit cards, one per currency. 



















  (5)   8                                                                                                                                              
where,  at  each  date  0,1, 2,..., t = the  consumption  vector  written  out  in  full  is 
  ( ) 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 , ,..., , ,..., , i i n n C C C C C C - - º C                                                   (6) 
and E denotes the expectations operator. On the menu are odd-numbered cash goods 
1 3 2 1 2 1 , ,..., ,..., i n C C C C - - ,  and  even-numbered  credit  goods  2 4 2 2 , ,..., ,..., i n C C C C .  Both 
2 1 i C -  and  2i C   ( ) n i ,..., 1 =  carry a price tag reading  i P  units of currency i per unit of  
2 1 i C -  or  2i C ; currency i is the unit of account for both cash good  1 2 - i  and credit good 
2i  ( ) n i ,..., 1 = .  The  quantity  of  currency  i  is  denoted  by  i M   ( ) n i ,..., 1 = .  All 
consumption takes place at the end of the period. For simplicity we confine analysis to 
the case of full current information. That is, at the beginning of each period the state of 
the economy is known, but there is there is no new information until the beginning of 
the next period. 
The  period  utility  function  ( ) U ×   is  assumed  to  be  concave  and  twice 
differentiable  in  its  2n  arguments.  In  order  to  guarantee  that  each  money  demand 
function has a negative sign with respect to its own-currency interest rate (see below) it 
is also assumed that  i i U 2 , 1 2 -  is less than either  1 2 , 1 2 - - - i i U  or  i i U 2 , 2 - . In other words, 
we impose an upper bound on the extent of any Edgeworth complementarity that might 
obtain between cash goods and credit goods denominated in the same currency. 
Currency  substitution  and  complementarity  can  be  defined  in  terms  of  sign 
restrictions  arising  from  a  quasi-indirect  utility  function.  This  requires  some 
explanation. The equilibrium quantity of real balances i is given by  i i P M  and the 
endowment of commodity i to the representative agent is given by  i Y   ( ) n i ,..., 1 = . In a 
full-current-information environment, cash-in-advance constraints bind, that is,  
2 1 i i i M PC - =                  ( ) n i ,..., 1 = .   (7) 
Goods-market equilibrium requires    9                                                                                                                                              
2 1 2 i i i C C Y - + =               ( ) n i ,..., 1 = .  (8) 




, ,.., , ,..., ,
i i n n
i n
i i n n
M M M M M M
U Y Y Y
P P P P P P
￿ ￿
- - - ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
.  (9) 
Now real-balances 1 and 2 are Edgeworth substitutes ("serve similar wants and needs") 
if and only if 
2
1 1 2 2
1 2
1 1 2 2 1 2
1 2
, , , ,... 0
M M M M U
Y Y
P P P P M M
P P
￿ ￿ ¶
- - < ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ¶ ¶ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
.  (10) 
In terms of the direct utility function this means 
13 14 23 24 0 U U U U - - + < .  (11) 
This Edgeworth criterion will be shown to correspond closely to an analogue of the 
familiar  “gross  substitutes”  criterion  derived  from  an  “ordinary”  demand  function
1. 
Reversal of the inequality defines currency complementarity. 
As in Lucas (1984) and Lucas and Stokey (1987), the timing assumptions here 
are that all transactions are conducted at the beginning of the period, including portfolio 
reallocations, whereas production and consumption take place at the end of the period. 
At the beginning of each period the agent' s sources of funds  t W  can be written as  





- - + + + + + º
n
i





1 1   (12) 
where  it S   is  spot  units  of  currency  i  per  unit  of  currency  n  ( ) 1 º n S ,  it H   is  the 
helicopter-style  drop  of  currency  i,  it B   is  receipts  from  currency-i  trade  credits 
purchased in period  1 - t  (assumed to be of the discount-bill variety, and negative in the 
case  of  trade  debts),  ( ) 1 1 - + it R   is  the  period-t  currency-i  price  of  a  discount  bill 
denominated in currency i,  1 , - t i F   is the one-period-ahead forward price, determined in   10                                                                                                                                              
period  1 - t , of currency i per unit of currency n  ( ) 1 º n F  , and  it X  is the number of 
forward contracts to sell  i F  units of currency i in exchange for one unit of currency n. 
( ) 0 º nt X  . 
Forward  contracts  are  derivative  securities  that  can  be  replicated  by  suitable 
combinations of long and short positions in discount bills. Hence they are redundant in 
the portfolio of the representative agent. However, in order to confirm that Covered 
Interest Parity holds in our model (see Appendix 1), forward contracts are included 
here. 
Uses of funds are shown by the budget constraint of the representative agent: 
( ) ( ) { }
1 1




t it it it i t it i t i t
i




￿ ￿ ¢ = + + + + ￿ ￿ ￿ .    (13) 
That is, available resources are allocated between money balances, discount bills, and 
goods. 
In addition to the aggregate resource constraint (8), we have the money supply 
identity 
it it t i M H M = + -1 , .    (14) 
Also, one person' s trade credit is another' s trade debt, so that 
0 = it B   (15) 
in the aggregate. 
Aggregate forward positions in currencies have an analogous zero-sum feature: 
0 = it X                             ( n i ,..., 1 = ).                                                            (16) 
           To recapitulate, the forcing variables in this model consist of a beginning-of-
period helicopter drop of n currencies  t H , together with an end-of-period endowment 
of n outputs  t Y , in quantities known to agents at the beginning of the period.   11                                                                                                                                              
 
3.2. Solution 
The  problem  of  the  representative  agent  is  readily  solved  by  dynamic 
programming. For convenience we drop time subscripts and denote one-period-ahead 
values by primes. The relevant recursion is: 
( )




, , , max
n
i i i i i
i





º + - ￿
C,M,B ,X , , P R S C  






i i i i i i i
i




￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ¢ + - + + + + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
( )
1 (1 ) , , , E J W r
- ￿ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ + + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
P R S     ,  (17) 
where vectors are indicated by bold letters,  i m  is the multiplier to the cash-in-advance 
constraint on purchases of cash good  1 2 - i   ( ) n i ,..., 1 = , measured in terms of currency 
n,  and  l   is  the  multiplier  to  the  budget  constraint,  with  the  interpretation  of  the 
marginal utility of wealth measured in terms of currency n. 
First-order conditions with respect to  2 1 2 , , , i i i i C C M B - ¢ and  i X¢ are 
( )
1 1 1
2 1 1 0 i i i i i i i U S P S R P m l
- - -
- - - + =   (18) 
( )
1 1
2 1 0 i i i i U S R P l
- - - + =   (19) 
( ) ( )
1 1 1 (1 ) 0 i i i S E S m l r l
- - - ¢ ¢ - + + =   (20) 
( ) ( )
1 1 1 1 (1 ) 0 i i i R S E S l r l
- - - ¢ ¢ - + + + =   (21) 
( )
1 (1 ) 0 i i i E S F S r l
- ¢ ¢ ¢ + - = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  (22) 
 
For an analysis of these conditions see Appendix 1. 
   12                                                                                                                                              
3.3. Money demands 
As a preliminary to analysing money demands, note that (18), (19) and (20) give 












- = +    ( n i ,..., 1 = )       .  (23) 








M M M M
Y Y
P P P P
￿ ￿
- - ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
. This generates n money demand functions  ( ) , i L Y R  
( n i ,..., 1 = ). 
           The functions  ( ) , i L Y R  are in general complicated mappings from the quasi-
indirect  utility  function  ( ) 1 1,..., n n n U M P Y M P -   and  interest  rates  ( ) n R R ,..., 1 .  We 
ease analysis while maintaining relevance to the Australian case by going to the special 
case  of  a  "small"  value  of  currency  1,  parallelling  the  familiar  "small  country" 







  are 
assumed  to  be  second-order.  For  example,  one  could  think  of  currency  2  as  the, 
deutschmark, yen, or US dollar, while currency 1 corresponds to the Australian dollar. 
We also set  2 = n . 
The total differential of the equilibrium counterpart of Eq. (23), with currency 1 
assumed "small", and in the case n = 2, can be written as  




11 12 1 21 22 1 1 13 14 1 23 24 2 2 1 1
2 2 33 34 2 43 44
1 / 1 /
0 1
U U R U U M P U U R U U M P d n M P
d n M P U U R U U
￿ ￿ - - + - - - + - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿





( ) ( )
( )
12 1 22 1 14 1 24 2 2 1 1
4 2 2 2 2 34 2 44 2
1 1 0
.
0 / / 0 1
U R U Y U R U Y U dR d nY
U M P dR d nY U R U V
￿ ￿ - + + - + + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - + + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿
  (24).   13                                                                                                                                              
This has the compact representation 
( ) G = W +Q ￿ ￿ d n M P dR d nY   (25) 
where the definitions of new symbols are clear from (24). The determinant of  G , or 
G , is given by 
( ) 1 1 / M P ( )( ) ( )( ) 11 12 1 21 22 33 34 2 43 44 1 1 U U R U U U U R U U - - + - - - + - ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿   0 > .    (26) 
Straightforward manipulation of Eq. (25) gives the sign of  1 1 / nL R ¶ ¶ ￿  : 
( ) ( )
( )( )
1 1 2 1 1
1 11 12 1 21 22
/ /
1
n M P U M P
R U U R U U
¶
=
¶ - - + -
￿
                                    < 0.     (27) 
Similarly, with respect to the "foreign" interest rate we get  




U U U R U U n M P
R
- - + + - ￿ ￿ ¶ < ￿ ￿ = > ¶ G
￿
.  (28) 
If the term  ( ) 1 23 24 R U U -  is second-order, currency substitution in the Edgeworth sense 
is necessary and sufficient to deliver a positive sign for the right-hand term.
2 Currency 
complementarity is associated with a negative sign.
3  
Turning to the effects of changes in the scale variables, for domestic output  1 Y  
we have 
( ) ( )
( )( )
12 1 1 1 1
1 11 12 1 21 22
1
1
U R V n M P
nY U U R U U
- + + ￿ ￿ ¶ ￿ ￿ =
¶ - - + -
￿
￿
                                   >  0.     (29) 
By  contrast,  the  effect  of  the  foreign  scale  variable  on  domestic  money  demand  is 
ambiguous: 
4   14                                                                                                                                              
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )( ) ( )
14 1 22 2 1 1
2 11 12 1 21 22





U R U V n M P
nY U U R U U
U U R U U U R U Y
- + + ￿ ￿ ¶ ￿ ￿ =
¶ - - + -





  (30) 
Recalling our assumption that the final term in square brackets is negative, there 
are  three  factors  making  for  the  "perverse"  case  ( ) 1 1 2 0 n M P nY ¶ ¶ < ￿ ￿ .  These  are 
substitution  between  domestic  cash  goods  and  foreign  credit  goods  ( ) 14 0 U < , 
complementarity between domestic and foreign credit goods ( ) 24 0 U > , and substitution 
between domestic and foreign monies  ( )( ) ( ) 13 14 1 23 24 1 0 U U R U U - - + - < . By way of 
explanation  of  the  first  two  factors,  an  increase  in  foreign  output  will  raise  the 
equilibrium quantity of foreign credit goods, as well as foreign cash goods, so if the 
foreign credit good substitutes for the domestic cash good ( ) 14 0 U <  and complements 
the domestic credit good  ( ) 24 0 U >  then the total available quantity  1 Y  of domestic 
goods will be reallocated towards domestic credit goods, and away from domestic cash 
goods. On both counts the equilibrium quantity of domestic real balances will fall. 
 
4. Empirics 
This section presents our empirical findings  concerning currency  preferences 
and the Australian dollar.  
 
4.1. Money demand estimates   15                                                                                                                                              
A  perennial  issue  in  money  demand  regressions  is  the  choice  of  monetary 
aggregate. Since Section 3 recognises the transactions motive for holding money, and 
assumes that money does not bear interest, we opt for M0 (monetary base) and M1 
(narrow money) measures. Section 3 highlights "cash in advance" theory, suggesting a 
beginning-of-period  dating  for  money  stocks  rather  than  end-of-period  or  period-
average  dating.
5  Similarly,  the  interest  rates  (opportunity  costs)  are  dated  on  a 
beginning-of-period basis. The theory suggests using GDP deflators rather than CPIs for 
transforming nominal money balances into real ones. 
Our data are quarterly, and span 1985 to 2001. This choice of start date mitigates 
measurement difficulties arising from the financial innovations and deregulations that 
were a feature of the first half of the 1980s in Australia (Milbourne, 1990). It implies 
that our sample falls entirely within the post-1983 era of floating exchange rates. The 
transition in 1999:4 from deutschmarks to euros is handled by dummy variables. All the 
variables  employed  in  our  analysis  are  seasonally  adjusted  whenever  a  seasonal  is 
present. 
The money demand regressions reported below are estimated by the Johansen 
technique, which turned out to yield estimates with better diagnostic properties than 
dynamic OLS. In all cases the estimated functional form is  
             mk  =  ￿ + p + ￿y + ￿R + e   (31) 
where mk  ( ) 0,1 k =  is the log of either Australia' s monetary base ( ) 0 k =  or volume of 
M1  ( ) 1 k = ,  ￿  is  the  intercept  term,  p  is  the  log  of  Australia' s  GDP  deflator, 
￿ ( ) , , , AUD DEM JPY USD b b b b º   is  a  row  vector  of  coefficients  showing  elasticities  with 
respect  to  scale  variables,  y  is  a  column  vector  of  logged  GDPs  and 
￿ ( ) , , , AUD DEM JPY USD g g g g º  is a row vector of coefficients showing semi-elasticities with   16                                                                                                                                              
respect to opportunity-cost variables. For example,  AUD b  is the elasticity with respect to 
Australia’s GDP, and  AUD g   is the  semi-elasticity with  respect to  Australia’s  90-day 
Bank-Accepted Bill rate. The error term is e . Results are set out in Table 1. 
[Table 1 here] 
The linear homogeneity restriction imposed on prices was only barely rejected at 
a 5% significant level for the M0 estimate (the result of the applied LR test is Chi^2(1) 
= 3.9229 [0.0476]) and was not rejected by the applied LR-test for the M1 estimate 
(Chi^2(1) = 1.1572 [0.2820]) 
5.Therefore, we can reasonably state in the latter case that 
the non-existence of money illusion assumption is satisfied. Although the evidence with 
respect to price homogeneity is not strong for the M0 estimate, we restrict the price 
level in line with our theoretical model.  
Beginning  with  the  domestic  opportunity  costs  of  holding  M0  and  M1  we 
confirm the significantly negative signs predicted by standard theory. The absolute size 
of the M0 semi-elasticity is small, consistent with the low volatility of V0 over the 
sample period. 
Turning to the offshore semi-elasticities, there is a positive coefficient for the 
German opportunity-cost variable in the M1 case. Specifically, a rise of 1 percentage 
point in the German call money rate is associated with a 2.7 percent rise in the demand 
for Australia' s M1. Hence, we find that there was substitution between the deutschmark 
and  the  Australian  dollar  (at  least  in  the  case  of  M1),  consistent  with  Cheah  and 
Kingston (1987). 
By contrast, there is a negative coefficient for the Japanese opportunity cost 
variable, for both M0 and M1. Although the coefficient is significant only in the latter 
case, it is sizeable; a rise  of 1 percentage  point  in the Japanese call money  rate is 
associated with a 4.7% fall in the demand for Australia' s M1. We conclude that the   17                                                                                                                                              
Japanese yen and Australian dollar have been complements. This is consistent with the 
observation  that  commodity-importing  Japan  has  an  economy  that  is  exceptionally 
complementary  with  that  of  commodity-exporting  Australia  (without  ruling  out  the 
possibility of a capital-account explanation). 
Judging by the insignificant coefficient on the US Federal Funds rate in the case 
of both M0 and M1, there was neither substitution nor complementarity between the US 
dollar  and  its  Australian  counterpart.  This  is  contrary  to  the  intuition  that  the  two 
currencies  are  substitutes,  given  the  similarities  between  the  structures  of  the  two 
economies. One possible explanation is multicollinearity involving either the US and 
Australian scale variables or the US and Australian opportunity-cost variables. Another 
explanation runs as follows: As one of the very few first-world commodity exporters, 
the Australian economy tends to be complementary with the developed-world economy 
that  accounts  for  the  bulk  of  Australia' s  international  trade  and  payments,  yet  it  is 
scarcely an exaggeration to say that the United States is the developed-world economy. 
During the 1990s, for example, the United States was the destination of over half the 
world' s international portfolio investment. In this way the Australian dollar may have 
been  pushed  away  from  its  natural  relationship  of  being  a  substitute  for  its  US 
counterpart. 
Concerning scale variables, domestic GDP has a strongly significant influence 
on  the  demand for the Australian  dollar, as  one would expect. German GDP has a 
significantly  positive  effect  on  the  demand  for  Australia' s  monetary  base,  whereas 
Japanese GDP has a significantly negative effect. Section 3 was ambiguous about the 
influence  of  foreign  scale  variables  on  domestic  money  demand.  Moreover, 
synchronization  of  the  international  business  cycle  could  well  be  creating 
multicollinearity problems. The negative sign for the coefficient on the Japanese scale   18                                                                                                                                              
variable is not only at odds (to some extent) with the Section 3 theory, but with results 
later in this section on third-currency effects. In all these ways there are limits to what 
can be inferred about the estimates of particular scale coefficients.  
 
4.2. Restrictions 
Section 3 noted the plausible restriction that an increase of 1 percent point in 
interest rates everywhere will reduce the demand for domestic money, even if domestic 
money is a substitute for one or more foreign currencies. Likewise, a rise of 1 per cent 
in outputs everywhere should raise the demand for domestic money even if a foreign 
scale variable enters the relevant regression with a negative coefficient. 
A preliminary exercise is simply to calculate the “global” scale and opportunity-
cost coefficients, implied by Table 1, that correspond to the mental experiments just 
described. In the case of M0 the relevant global coefficient for scale variables is given 
by  1.13  +  0.52  -  0.63  =  1.02.  Likewise,  the  global  coefficient  for  opportunity-cost 
coefficients comes in at -.001. In the case of M1 the global scale and opportunity-cost 
variables  are  1.37  and  -.047.  Overall,  then,  each  of  the  global  coefficients  has  the 
expected sign. Moreover, each is of a magnitude that is no less reasonable than its 
domestic counterpart. 
Again drawing on Table 1, Table 2 tests formally some international restrictions 
on the demand for the Australian dollar. 
[Table 2 here] 
Beginning with the first row of Table 2, consider the hypothesis that in the case 
of M1 the coefficient on the 90-day BAB rate is equal to the negative of the coefficient 
on the German call money rate. Although the Australian coefficient is more precisely 
estimated, we cannot reject this hypothesis.   19                                                                                                                                              
The  second  row  reports  a  test  of  the  hypothesis  that  in  the case  of  M0  the 
coefficient on the BAB rate is equal to the negative of the coefficient on the Japanese 
call money rate. Although the Japanese coefficient is very imprecisely estimated, we 
again cannot reject the hypothesis that the absolute values of the coefficients are equal. 
Moreover,  we  cannot  be  confident  of  a  negative  slope  for  Australia' s  M0  demand 
function with respect to interest rates worldwide, consistent with the very low volatility 
of Australia’s V0 over our sample period. 
Turning to the third row, consider the hypothesis that in the case of M1 the 
coefficient  on  the  Australian  scale  variable  is  equal  to  the  negative  of  its  German 
counterpart.  This  is  rejected  at  the  10%  level.  The  fourth  row  shows  tests  of  the 
hypothesis that that the opportunity-cost semi-elasticities sum to zero. This cannot be 
rejected in the case of M0, but can in the case of M1. 
The last row reports a test of the hypothesis that the scale elasticities sum to 
zero. This can be rejected for both M0 and M1, engendering confidence that a 1 percent 
increase in GDP worldwide will raise the demand for the Australian dollar. 
 
4.3. Implications for exchange rates 
Non-separable  currency  preferences  have  implications  for  exchange  rates. 
Notably,  there  can  be  third-currency  effects.  Yet  the  pre-existing  literature employs 
bilateral models of exchange rates, with the sole exception of Hodrick and Vassalou 
(2002).  They  build  a  multilateral  factor  model  based  on  short-term  and  long-term 
interest  rates.  Bilateral modelling  was  indeed found  to  be  inadequate  for  the  major 
currencies. For example, UK interest rates affected DEM/USD and DEM/JPY exchange 
rates. Drawing upon the Euler equations derived in Section 3, the remainder of this 
section tests for third-currency effects on the AUD over the period 1986 to 1998.    20                                                                                                                                              
The  estimated  equation  is  derived  in  Appendix  1.  For  convenience  it  is 
reproduced here (recall that D is the backward-difference operator): 
ij e a ¢ = + ￿ nY¢ D + ￿ ￿ n R r d e ¢ ¢ D + +                                                               (32)  
The dependent variable  ( / ) ( ) ij i j i j e n S S R R ¢ ¢ ¢ ºD - - ￿ is the excess return, measured in 
units of currency i , to a one-period zero-investment strategy whereby the agent borrows 
one unit of currency i, immediately exchanges the proceeds into currency j, and then 
lends in that currency. In other words,  ij e¢  represents ex post deviations from Uncovered 
Interest Parity. On the right-hand side of Eq. (32) there is an intercept term a , predicted 
to  be  zero,  row  vectors  ￿  and  ￿  of  slope  coefficients,  with  signs  that  depend  in  a 
complicated way on the structure of preferences, a scalar slope coefficient ￿, which 
reflects Appendix 1’s choice of currency n as a numeraire currency, and an independent 
variable  n r¢ denoting the current period’s ex post real interest rate on discount bills 
denominated in the numeraire currency. Results are shown in Table 3, wherein i  stands 
for the AUD and n stand for the USD. 
[Table 3 here]. 
 
Beginning with the first row of Table 3, a prediction in Appendix 1 is that to the 
extent there is nontrivial variation in the ex post real interest rate on discount bills 
denominated in the analyst’s choice of numeraire currency (in our case the USD), the 
variable in question will carry a negative sign. For all three hypothetical speculative 
positions, however, the estimates of d  are insignificant. 
Rows three to nine bear on the question of on third-currency effects.
7  Rises in 
the US Federal Funds rate were associated with depreciations of the AUD against the 
yen,  controlling  for  the  AUD/JPY  interest-rate  spread.  By  contrast,  rises  in  third-
currency  output  growth  rates  tended  to  be  associated  with  appreciations  of  the 
Australian dollar, controlling for the relevant interest-rate spreads. Rises in US GDP   21                                                                                                                                              
growth  were  associated  with  appreciations  of  the  Australian  dollar  against  the 
deutschmark, controlling for the spread between Australian and German interest rates. 
Likewise  rises  in  Japanese  GDP  growth  were  associated  with  appreciations  of  the 
Australian dollar against both the deutschmark and the US dollar. 
Two of the constant terms in the Table 3 regressions are significantly different 
from zero, contrary to a prediction derived in Appendix 1. 
That the AUD has tended more often than not to strengthen when third-currency 
outputs  grow  more  strongly  may  reflect a  tendency  for  major foreign  currencies  to 
complement the Australian dollar more strongly than they complement one another, 
consistent  with  the  observation  that  there  is  an  unusual  degree  of  complementarity 
between Australian goods and services and those of its trading partners. 
 
5. Summary and conclusion 
Atemporally  non-separable  currency  preferences  can  be  classified  under  the 
broad headings of currency substitution and currency complementarity. Substitution and 
complementarity can each be defined either in utility terms or in terms of the cross-
elasticity  of  money  demand  with  respect  to  a  foreign  interest  rate.  Specifically, 
substitute  currencies  serve  similar  wants  and  needs  in  trade  and  payments,  and  are 
evidenced  by  negatively  correlated  velocities,  or  (more  reliably)  by  positive  cross-
interest  elasticities  in  a  money  demand  regression.  By  contrast,  complementary 
currencies are used in conjunction with  each  other  and are evidenced by  positively 
correlated velocities, or negative cross-interest elasticities. 
Velocity correlations for the period 1985 to the turn of the century corroborated 
Brittain' s (1981) finding that the deutschmark and US dollar were substitutes. They also   22                                                                                                                                              
suggested the novel generalization that the yen is a prime candidate for complementarity 
with other currencies. 
Money demand regressions provide a more rigorous basis for inferences about 
substitution and complementarity. Over the period 1985 to the turn of the century, a 1 
percentage point rise in the German call money rate raised the demand for Australia' s 
M1 in real terms by 2.7 per cent, the same as the absolute value of the semi-elasticity 
for the Australian 90 day Bank Bill Rate, although less well determined. On the other 
hand, there was no significant effect of the German rate on the demand for M0, even 
though coefficients on the Australian Bank Bill rate had the standard negative signs for 
M0  and  M1 alike.  On balance,  then, there  is  evidence  for  substitution  between  the 
deutschmark and the Australian dollar.  
There was a significantly negative coefficient on the Japanese call money rate in 
an  M1  regression,  suggesting  complementarity  between  the  yen  and  the  Australian 
dollar. As noted above, this type of result is new. 
In the case of the US dollar there was negligible evidence from money demand 
regressions for either substitution or complementarity with the Australian dollar. This 
result echoed previous findings for the US dollar vis-à-vis its Canadian counterpart. 
Turning to the question of third-currency effects, multilateral models of excess 
returns to hypothetical uncovered short positions in the Australian dollar over the period 
1986 to 1998 came up with the following instances. Rises in the US Federal Funds rate 
were associated with depreciations of the Australian dollar against the yen, controlling 
for the spread between interest rates in Australia and Japan. Rises in US GDP growth 
were associated with appreciations of the Australian dollar against the deutschmark, and 
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deutschmark  and  the  US  dollar,  again  controlling  for  the  relevant  spreads  between 
Australian and offshore interest rates.  
In short, there is considerable evidence for offshore influences on the demand 
for  the  Australian  dollar,  and  for  third-currency  effects  on  its  external  value.  By 
concentrating  on  interactions  involving  a  small  currency,  however,  this  paper  has 
scarcely  scratched  the  surface  of  what  atemporally  non-separable  preferences  might 
imply for interactions between the major currencies. One topic for future research is the 
money-demand  analogue  of  the  much-tested  “symmetry  restriction”
8  from  standard 
demand analysis. Another topic is potential gains to moving beyond a bilateral setting 
when  investigating  “forward  discount  puzzles”
9,  that  being  a  shorthand  term  for  a 
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Appendix 1: Asset pricing 
 
The first-order conditions (18) to (22) have a number of implications for asset 
prices. The purpose of this appendix is to draw out these, for completeness, and to 
justify the selection of explanatory variables in Section 4’s empirical investigation of 
third-currency effects. 
Specialised to the case  n i = , Eq. (21) gives the standard Fisher-type result that 
the  price  of  a  discount  bill  denominated  in  a  particular  currency  is  equal  to  the 
expectation of the stochastic discount factor: 
1






= ￿ ￿ + + ￿ ￿
         .  (A.1) 
Note that simple renumbering of the currencies gives the same result for  n i ¹ , once l  
has been suitably redefined for the relevant  n i ¹ . 
Eq. (21) gives a corresponding result for uncovered positions in foreign discount 
bills  (sometimes  described  as  speculating  in  foreign  "currency").  Specifically,  the 
currency-i price of a discount bill denominated in currency i is equal to the expectation 
of the product of the stochastic discount factor and the proportionate appreciation of 
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 .  (A.2) 
From Eqs. (23), (A.1) and (A.2) we obtain the familiar result that the interest 
factor for currency i relative to currency n will be as predicted by Uncovered Interest 
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.  (A.4) 
A  distinctive  feature  of  asset  pricing  here  is  the  rich  menu  of  potential 
determinants of the marginal utility of wealth  ( ) l . To see this, note that the first-order 
conditions (18), (19) and (20) together imply 
        





- = .  (A.5) 
Since  1 2 - i U   is  a  function,  in  equilibrium,  of  the  entire  vectors  P M   and  Y,  it  is 
potentially  possible  for  (say)  monetary  policy  in  Zaire  to  affect  asset  prices  in  
Australia. This observation can be translated into a testable proposition about the role of 
third-currency effects in deviations from Uncovered Interest Parity. Specifically, we 
explain such deviations by a multiple linear regression that includes changes in third-
currency interest rates and output growth rates among the explanatory variables. We 
need three steps. 
               Step one is to approximate the product of the currency n discount factor and 
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                                                               [overbars denote sample means; assume  ] n r r »                          
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                                                               [recall  that  2 1 i i C L - =   and  note  the  definitions    
/ ij i j nL R g º ¶ ¶ ￿  and  / ij i j nL nY h º ¶ ¶ ￿ ￿  ] .(A.11) 
 
              Step two is a simple log-linearization: 
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               The final step uses the two foregoing linearizations to express deviations from 
Uncovered Interest Parity,  ij e¢ , in a readily testable form: 
  ( ) ij ij i j e nS R R ¢ ¢ º D - - ￿                                                                               (A.13 
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                       a » + ￿ n D￿ Y¢+￿ n R r d e ¢ ¢ D + +                                                            (A.16) 
where  the  intercept  a   is  predicted  to  be  zero,  the  row  vectors  ￿  and  ￿  are  slope 
coefficients with signs that depend on the structure of preferences, d  is a negative slope 
coefficient that reflects our choice of currency n as the numeraire, and  e  is the error 
term. In contrast to its counterpart in Eq. (31), the error term here reflects the arrival of 
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Appendix 2: Stability of the money demand estimates 
 
This appendix tests for stability of the estimates in Table 1. We first examine the 
estimated coefficients'  stability by means of their recursive profile and subsequently the 
stability of the overall estimated relation using a one-step-forecast test and Chow' s one- 
and N-step-forecast and breakpoint tests. We apply these to the estimated vectors after 
normalisation  and  imposed  linear  homogeneity  restriction  on  prices.  The  results are 
reported in Fig. A1. 
[Fig. A1 here] 
[Fig. A2 here] 
In the case of M0 the coefficients are fairly stable over time. More precisely, the 
elasticity of the domestic scale variable slightly declines whereas the elasticity of the 
foreign scale variable in the case of Japan rises at the end of the estimated period. On 
the other hand, the semi-elasticity of the M0 money with respect to the Japanese interest 
rate apparently declines over time. The tests on the stability of the overall estimated 
relation tend not to reveal significant episodes of instability. The two exceptions are the 
result  of  a  one-step  forecast  and  Chow' s  one-step  test  that  both  indicate  moderate 
instability event in the fourth quarter of the year 2000. This instability event could well 
be the result of the Goods and Services Tax that was introduced in July 2000. We can 
also observe an effect of the Asian currency crisis during the year 1997. However, this 
event does not reach conventional significant levels. In the case of M1 there is a similar 
pattern. For example, we see a moderate increase in the elasticity with respect to the 
international scale variable, German GDP in this case.   29                                                                                                                                              
Footnotes 
 
1  By using an additive multi-period utility function we circumvent a standard objection 
to the Edgeworth criterion in one-period settings,  that is, its  fragility  in the face  of 
arbitrary monotonic-increasing transformations of the utility function. Put another way, 
the discounted sum of one-period felicities here is ordinal, but its constituent one-period 
felicities are not.  
             The term “ordinary” is placed within quotation marks because outputs appear as 
arguments of this paper’s money demand functions only as a consequence of the agent’s 
transactions demand (7) in conjunction with the aggregate resource constraint (8), not 
the budget constraint (13). The agent’s desire for cash goods is the only reason that she 
holds money. In standard one-period demand analysis, by contrast, the variable Y also 
represents sources of funds available to the agent. In both standard analysis and Tobin’s 
(1969)  analysis,  two  items  can  be  (gross)  substitutes  for  each  other  wholly  as  a 
consequence of the agent’s budget constraint. That is not the case here. 
 
2.  The  limiting  case  of  perfect  substitution  between  currencies  can  be  defined  as 
3 1 U U =  along with  4 2 U U = . That is, the marginal utility of cash good 1 is equal to the 
marginal utility of cash good 2, and the marginal utility of the credit good denominated 
in currency 1 is equal to the marginal utility of the credit good denominated in currency 
2. It is easy to show that in this case nominal interest rates are equalized internationally 
and absolute purchasing power holds. The exchange rate will follow a random walk, 
regardless of the system’s forcing processes (Boyer and Kingston 1987). 
 
3.  A  reader  of  Tobin  (1969)  might  interpret  a  negative  sign  as  the  hallmark  of 
substitution rather than complementarity. However, that would not only fail to square 
with  Edgeworth  concepts  of  substitution  and  complementarity,  but  sees  negatively-  30                                                                                                                                              
 
correlated  income  velocities  as  an  indication  of  complementarity  rather  than 
substitution, contrary to commonsense. 
 
4. In the limiting case of perfect substitution between currencies the sensitivity of the 
demand for currency 1 with respect to output 2 is zero. 
 
5. That money stocks are dated on a beginning-of period basis (as are interest rates) 
whereas  outputs  and  prices  are  dated  on  a  through-the  period  basis  is  perhaps 
unconventional  in  money  demand  regressions,  but  is  consistent  with  our  cash-in-
advance theory and delivers (marginal) improvements in empirical performance. 
 
6. The time profile of the LR-tests of price homogeneity is available from the authors 
upon request. 
 
7. In a preliminary version of this paper we estimated a version of Eq. (32) that was less 
tightly linked to the Section 3 model. Notably, the dependent variable was the (log of 
the) exchange rate rather than deviations from Uncovered Interest Parity, and there was 
a more extensive menu of independent variables.  Third-currency  effects were  found 
even  though  interest  rates  were  absent  from  the  dependent  variables,  engendering 
confidence that they are not just statistical artifacts. 
 
8. See Clements et al (1996) for a survey. According to our Section 3 framework , and 
provided that terms involving products of interest rates are second-order, the currency 
analogue of the symmetry condition is  
.
j j j i i i
j i i j
PM nL PM nL
S R S R
￿ ￿¶ ￿ ￿¶
= ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ¶ ¶ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
   31                                                                                                                                              
 
Boyer and Kingston (1987) use this condition in a theoretical analysis of exchange rates 
in order to eliminate a free parameter. 
 
9. See Engel (1996) for a survey of forward discount puzzles. The most famous of these 
is that currencies with “high” short-term interest rates have tended not to depreciate to 
the extent predicted by Uncovered Interest Parity. 
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Source: Reserve Bank of Australia; International Financial Statistics (IMF).  
 
Notes: Fig. 1 shows v1 for each country, that is, the log of quarterly GDP expressed as a fraction 
of the volume of M1. In 1999:1 Euro M1 is spliced to German M1. The covariance matrix of 
Dv0, and Dv1, that is, logged and differenced V0 and V1, is: 
 
  Germany  Japan  United States 
  Dv0  Dv1  Dv0  Dv1  Dv0  Dv1 
Germany  1  0  0 
Japan   -0.025  0.23  1  0 
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Fig. 2 




























Source: Reserve Bank of Australia; International Financial Statistics (IMF).  
 
Notes: See the notes to Fig. 1. The pairwise correlations between Dv0 in Australia and 
in Germany, Japan and the United States, along with the corresponding correlations for 
Dv1, are: 
   
  Germany  Japan  United States 
  Dv0  Dv1  Dv0  Dv1  Dv0  Dv1 
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Fig. A1 








































































































































Demand for the Australian dollar 
 
  Dependent variable (logs)  Independent variables 
(logs except for interest rates) 
    M0  M1 
AUD gdp deflator  1  1 








JPY gdp  -0.63 
(0.14)*** 
… 
USD gdp  … 
 
… 




DEM call money rate  …  0.027 
(0.0134)** 




USD Federal Funds rate  …  … 
 
Sources:  RBA, IMF 
Notes:  The estimation periods for M0 and M1 span 1985:1 to 2001:2 and 1985:1 to 
2001:3 respectively. Standard errors are shown in parentheses; *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels; … denotes insignificance of 
the particular variable. Money prices and output are in logs; interest rates are in 
levels. Linear homogeneity of money with respect to the price level is imposed; 
tests  accepting  this  restriction  are  accepted  only  in  the  case  of  M0,  with 
rejection at the 1% level in the case of M1. The reported estimates are via the 
Johansen  technique,  which  accords  with  dynamic  OLS  estimates  in  all 
instances except for the elasticity of M1 with respect to German GDP. Constant 










Likelihood ratio test where applicable  Hypothesis 
M0  M1 
AUD DEM g g = -   n.a.  1.1572 
(0.5607) 




AUD DEM b b = -   n.a.  5.1949 
(0.0745)* 









Notes:  *  indicates  rejection  of  the  null  at  the  10%  significance  level.  Each  result  is  for  a 
Chi^2(2) statistic, corresponding to a restriction of a unit coefficient on p in addition to the 





























Third currency effects  










USD r¢   -----  -----  ----- 
AUD R¢ D   -----  -----  0.047 
(0.026)* 
DEM R¢ D   -----  -----  ----- 
USD R¢ D   -----  -0.256 
(0.115)** 
----- 
JPY R¢ D   -----  0.212 
(0.120)** 
----- 
AUD nY¢ D￿   -----  -----  ----- 
DEM nY¢ D￿   -----  -----  5.93 
(2.44)** 
USD nY¢ D￿   32.18 
(19.01)* 
-----  13.52 
(6.85)* 












Source: RBA, IMF 
 
Notes:  The data span 1986:1 to 2001:4 , except in the case of positions in 
DEM, in  which  case  the  data  end  in  1998:4.  Standard  errors are shown in 
parentheses; *, ** and *** - indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. ----- denotes insignificance of the particular variable. Estimation 
is by FIML. An AR(1) process of the dependent variable is considered in the 
estimated equation.  
 
 
 